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This Chronicle covers recent legislative developments in Spain 
for the period 2010-2012. 
I. APPLICATION OF LAWS: MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN 
SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Because it also concerns the law of the United States of 
America, reference should be made to the entry into force on 
February 1, 20101 of the Agreement2 related to the application of 
the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters between 
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.3 
This new agreement increases the possibilities to exchange 
financial information between the two States in the context of a 
criminal investigation. 
Also, article 16 bis 1(a) of the Treaty sets forth the obligation 
of the Requested State to ascertain if the banks located in its 
territory possess information about the existence of bank accounts 
whose holder is a natural or juridical person4 suspected or charged 
with a criminal offense. The Requested State shall not deny the 
request for assistance on the grounds of bank secrecy. 
The Agreement also includes a provision that joint 
investigative teams may be established between the two States 
(article 16 ter) for the purpose of taking testimony, expert opinion 
or any other investigative activities. The measures taken by the 
                                                                                                             
 1. Published in B.O.E. n. 22, Jan. 26, 2010. 
 2. In fact, it is an instrument that executes particularly for each of the 
Member States of the European Union, a broader agreement concluded between 
the European Union and the United States (see Art. 3.2(a) of the Agreement on 
Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the United States of 
America, signed on June 25, 2003); 2003 O.J. (L181) 27, 34. 
 3. The treaty was signed on November 20, 1990. 
 4. The Treaty uses the term “legal person.” 
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members of the joint investigative team may be executed directly 
in any of the States without the other State having to submit a 
request for mutual legal assistance (article 16 ter, 4). 
II. LAW OF PERSONS 
In the area of the Law of Persons, three new developments took 
place. The first two exemplify the legislators’ effort to adapt to the 
changes resulting from the new options—often driven by medical 
and scientific progress—promoting the individual freedom to 
decide one’s own sexual orientation (and even gender designation), 
and consequently, in deciding the composition of one’s own 
family. 
A. Ratification by Spain of the International Convention on the 
Recognition of Decisions Recording a Sex Reassignment 
Regarding sexual orientation, on July 16, 2011,5 Spain ratified 
the Convention6 on the recognition of decisions recording a sex 
reassignment. This Convention, drafted by a European 
Intergovernmental Agency,7 is a multilateral agreement that sets 
forth the mutual recognition between the signatory States of 
judicial or administrative decisions recording a person’s sex 
reassignment that have occurred in a Contracting State. The sex 
reassignment affecting the citizen or resident in a Contracting State 
shall be recognized in the other Contracting States if two 
conditions are met:  
1. A physical alteration (i.e., by means of surgery) of the 
person concerned has been made; and 
                                                                                                             
 5. B.O.E. n. 36, Feb. 11, 2011. 
 6. Convention of September 12, 2000. 
 7. The International Commission on Civil Status is based in Strasbourg, 
France. It was founded on September 29-30, 1948 in the post-war context of the 
time. It is intended to facilitate the cooperation between States for the mutual 
recognition of vital records (including, among others, birth, marriage, divorce or 
death certificates) or any other official documents indicating the civil status of 
persons. 
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2. That the physical alteration shall be officially recognized in 
the Contracting State through the recordation of the judicial or 
administrative decision recognizing a person’s sex reassignment in 
the Civil Status Registry. 
B. The New Provisions Concerning Registration in the Civil 
Registry of the Filiation of Children Born Abroad by Means of 
Surrogate or Substitute Motherhood 
The second legal development includes the question of the so-
called “surrogate” or “substitute motherhood”.8 In Spain, surrogate 
motherhood agreements are still legally prohibited (Article 10.1, 
Law on Assisted Human Reproduction Techniques).9 Thus, when 
the birth of a human being results from this form of pregnancy, 
only the gestating woman will be recognized as the mother, never 
the woman who, alone or coupled with her partner, agrees to the 
surrogacy.10 Even if the contracting party is a male, the legislation 
does not allow the possibility of considering him the father.  
Notwithstanding, neither courts nor administrative authorities 
in Spain have been able to turn their backs to the situation of 
children born abroad by surrogacy, in cases where a Spanish 
citizen has entered into a surrogate motherhood contract in a State 
where legislation permits this kind of contract. The problem might 
arise when, once the child is born in the State where the contract 
was entered into, the Spanish person or couple who executed the 
contract intend to register the child as his or theirs11 in the Civil 
Registry of Spain (Civil Registry). 
                                                                                                             
 8. The common colloquialism used is “rent-a-mother” or “rent-a-womb”. 
 9. Law 14/2006 of May 26, related to assisted human reproduction 
techniques. Art. 10.1 prescribes: “The contract wherein it is agreed that the 
pregnancy, with or without payment, will be carried by a woman who gives up 
the maternal filiation in favor of the other party or a third party shall be null and 
void.” B.O.E. n. 126, May 27, 2006. 
 10. Art. 10.2, Law 14/2006, supra note 9: “The filiation of children born by 
surrogacy shall be determined by birth.” 
 11. In many cases, the child born by surrogacy is, indeed, a biological child 
of the contracting parties because the gestating mother has been fertilized with 
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This practice has increased notably since the Spanish Civil 
Code was amended in 2005 to allow and recognize same-sex 
marriage.12 Since then, many male same-sex couples who can only 
achieve paternity by contracting with a surrogate mother and 
fertilizing her with sperm or by any human reproductive material 
of either of them, have been denied—by both the Civil Registry 
and the courts—their attempts to establish the paternity of the child 
born by surrogate motherhood.13 
An administrative provision recently enacted has attempted to 
remedy this situation. It is a provision made by the General 
Directorate for Registries and Notaries on October 5, 2010 
concerning “the registration regime of the filiation of children born 
by surrogacy.” The Directorate General of Registers is a branch of 
the Ministry of Justice, serving as the hierarchical superior of the 
Spanish notaries and registers. Because it is a non-judicial 
administrative body, its decisions on the validity of the acts 
recorded in the Spanish registers14 have no judicial or normative 
value; they simply contain expert or doctrinal value and 
consequently are merely advisory.  
These provisions, otherwise, are binding for the Spanish 
Registers because they are public officers of this agency. 
Therefore, in the exercise of this function, the Directorate General, 
with the purpose to preserve the best interest of children born 
abroad by means of surrogate motherhood, has recognized that, in 
                                                                                                             
 
gametes or reproductive cells of the man or the woman, or of the male or female 
same-sex couple who contracted the surrogacy. 
 12. The recognition of same sex marriage in Spain is established in Law 
13/2005of July 1, which amended the Civil Code with respect to the right to 
marry; B.O.E. n. 157, Jul. 2, 2005. 
 13. An example of judicial decision rejecting such registration is the 
judgment of the Court of First Instance No. 15 of Valencia, September 15, 2010; 
Juz. Prim. n. 15 de Valencia, s. n. 193/2010. 
 14. The Directorate General of Registers safeguards the legality of issues 
relating to civil status, which are recorded in the Civil Registry, as well as the 
validity of the acts of disposition or agreements over immovable property, which 
are recorded in the Land Registry. 
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certain circumstances, those children can be entered in the Civil 
Registry as children of male applicants.15 Two conditions must be 
met: 
The first condition is formal. It requires that the filiation of the 
child born be accredited by a foreign judgment following 
exequatur proceedings16 in Spain. In any case, an administrative 
decision or medical certificate produced abroad will not be 
sufficient to obtain recognition in Spain. 
The second condition is substantive. It requires the verification 
by the Spanish Register, by way of the examination of the 
documentation submitted by the applicants, that the rights of both 
the child and the surrogate mother have been sufficiently 
guaranteed. In particular, it should be verified that the surrogate 
mother has the ability and natural capacity to understand and 
voluntarily renounce her maternity, and that the renunciation is 
made in the absence of any vice of consent (error, fraud or duress). 
C. The New Civil Registry Act  
Finally, the third development in the area of the Law of 
Persons is the enactment of the new Civil Registry Law in July 21, 
2011.17 Its entry into force will be delayed until 2014 due to the 
importance of the changes introduced by the law.18 The Civil 
Registry is the public record of acts affecting the civil status and, 
accordingly, the legal capacity of a person to exercise rights. The 
reform, undertaken for the reasons indicated below, includes a 
                                                                                                             
 15. Or persons, irrespective of their sex, who contracted surrogacy abroad. 
 16. The European Commission of Justice provides this definition of 
exequatur: a concept specific to private international law referring to the 
decision by a court authorizing the enforcement in that country of a judgment, 
arbitral award, authentic instrument or court settlement given abroad. Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/glossary/exequatur_en.htm (last visited on June 13, 
2013). 
 17. Civil Registry Act, Law 20/2011, B.O.E. n. 175, Jul. 22, 2011. 
 18. This law replaces the prior Civil Registry Law [hereinafter CRL] of 
June 8, 1957 (B.O.E. n. 15, Jun. 10, 1957). However, most likely because it 
introduces significant changes, its entry into force is postponed until July 22, 
2014 (so ordered by the 10th Final Disposition of the new law, supra note 17). 
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modification of the Spanish Civil Code concerning the acquisition 
of legal personality.19 
This important legislative reform is justified for several 
reasons, which primarily have to do with the internal organization 
of the Registry and the system of information management 
contained therein.  
Prior to this revision, the Civil Registry was a unitary body 
with several Registry offices distributed throughout the Spanish 
territories. Each office had custody of the books containing the 
records of the essential facts affecting the life of a person. The 
criterion for classification of the registry information was not by 
individuals or persons, but rather by the legally relevant fact: there 
was a registry for birth, another for marriage, a third registry for 
death, and another for tutorship and legal representation. In 
addition, the registrar or person responsible for each office of the 
Civil Registry was a member of the judiciary (the “Civil Registry 
Judge”). 
1. The first reason for this reform was the conversion of the 
former Registry maintained in books into a data retrieval system or 
electronic record, which will act as a database. In turn, this system 
allows administrative decentralization: citizens may apply for 
recordation of registerable facts affecting them at any Registry 
office and not only, as it was until the reform, at the office in the 
location where the fact occurred (e.g., place of birth). Despite this 
new decentralized organization, the unity of performance is 
guaranteed in all the offices, both by decisions and instructions 
issued by the aforementioned Directorate General of Registers20 
and by the possibility to appeal decisions made by the officials of 
the Registry offices to the Directorate General.21 
                                                                                                             
 19. Art. 30, Spanish Civil Code [Código Civil, hereinafter C.C.]. 
 20. As mentioned in the previous paragraph B, the Directorate General of 
Registers operates under the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for the 
most important legal records of Spain (The Civil Registry and the Land 
Registry). 
 21. Art. 85 CRL, supra note 17. 
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2. The second change affects the very officials who are in 
charge of the Registry offices. Previously, the official in charge of 
each Registry office was a judge. In order to clearly separate the 
judicial function and the purely administrative function of the 
Registry, this task is now assigned to officials of the Civil Service, 
although they must have a law degree.22 Notwithstanding, 
registration activity ultimately remains under judicial control 
because the decisions of the Directorate General of the Registers 
may be challenged by any interested party in civil court.23 
3. The main change introduced by the 2011 legislative reform 
affects systematic management, or the systematization, of Registry 
information. Fundamentally, it is intended that the Registry will 
become a historical or personal record for each Spanish citizen. To 
do this, the hitherto existing classification system based upon the 
fact (consisting of all births, marriages, deaths, tutorships or other 
forms of legal representation that were grouped in the same book) 
is replaced by a classification of persons or individuals, so that all 
the facts affecting their civil status24 will be grouped in the section 
or individual Registry25 that is assigned to each person within the 
General Registry. 
4. Finally, the greater importance ascribed by the new Civil 
Registry Law to the person or individual has resulted in two 
changes of material or substantive law: 
a. The first change is the reform of article 30, Civil Code of 
Spain, concerning the commencement of legal personality, or 
recognition of the natural person, as a subject of law.26 Until now, 
our Civil Code maintained the Romanist rule that birth alone does 
not determine the legal personality or juridical recognition of being 
                                                                                                             
 22. Second Additional Disposition CRL, supra note 17. 
 23. Art. 87 CRL, supra note 17. 
 24. Starting with the first registration, which is the act of birth. 
 25. Articles 6 & 44.3 CRL, supra note 17. 
 26. The amendment of the Civil Code is provided by the 3rd Final 
Disposition CRL, supra note 17. Despite the fact that this law will not enter into 
force until 2014, the amendment of Art. 30 of the Spanish Civil Code has 
immediate effect. 
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born as a person. In addition to the act of birth, one additional 
requirement was that the newborn would be recognized as having 
legal capacity and, accordingly, the capacity to have rights and 
duties, if the child survived at least twenty-four hours after 
separation from the mother’s womb. 
From now on, the recognition of the juridical personality of the 
individual is simultaneous to his birth, since the new article 30 of 
the Civil Code states that “legal personality is acquired from the 
moment the child is born alive, after complete separation from the 
mother’s womb.”27 
b. In the second place, and with the same purpose of 
strengthening the rights of the newborn child, the new Civil 
Registry Law of 2011 has abolished the right, previously 
recognized to the mother, of “disavowal” or denial of her maternity 
by a unilateral declaration recorded in the Registry, without 
contesting the filiation in court.28 The only requirement for 
extrajudicial action to deny maternity was for the mother to make 
the declaration at a time very close to the birth and registration.29 
As mentioned above, such unilateral right has been repealed in 
the new Registry Law of 2011, which thereby recognizes a 
                                                                                                             
 27. This is because it was necessary for the newborn to survive at least 
twenty-four hours from the time that the umbilical cord was cut. This 
requirement was intended to prevent important juridical effects, such as the 
devolution of succession rights from one family line in favor of another, caused 
by the birth of children with little chance of survival. 
 28. Such a unilateral right of the mother was the counterpart of the 
possibility that the birth registration could take place without her participation 
since anyone who has certain knowledge of the birth is urged to report it to the 
Registry (art. 42 CRL, 1957, supra note 18). Moreover, it is mandatory for the 
doctor and other healthcare personnel attending the birth to report it to the 
Registry (art. 44 CRL, 1957). 
 29. The alleged mother shall make the declaration of disavowal or denial of 
maternity within 15 days following the notification from the Registrar informing 
her of the registration of maternity. See art. 47.3 CRL, 1957, supra note 18:  
[t]he reference of this filiation can be suppressed by a judicial decision 
or by disavowal of the person who appears as the mother formalized 
before the Registrar, which shall be entered in the margin of the birth 
certificate. This disavowal cannot be made beyond 15 days of that 
notification. . . . 
As above-mentioned, the prior act, which shall be in effect until 2014 (see supra 
note 18), was enacted on June 8, 1957. 
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previous jurisprudential rule.30 Under this previous judicial 
interpretation, article 47.3 of the 1957 Civil Registry Law was 
unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable, because the 
registration (and thus official recognition) of filiation depended 
exclusively on the will of the mother, to the detriment of the 
newborn child. Conversely, upon the entry into force of the new 
2011 Civil Registry Law, the only way to cancel the registration of 
maternity will be by way of court judgment, which the alleged 
mother can only get by demonstrating to the courts (with proof and 
with guarantees for the rights of the newborn child inherent to the 
judicial process) that maternity was falsely attributed to her.  
III. FAMILY LAW 
In the area of Family law, the main legislative development has 
been the entry into force on January 1, 2011 of Law 25/2010 of 
July 29, 2010, promulgating Book II of the Catalonia Civil Code 
(Codi Civil de Catalunya),31 related to Persons and the Family. 
A. Spain as a Multi-legislative State, with Coexisting Territorial 
Civil Law Systems 
Catalonia, like the Basque country, Aragon, Navarre, the 
Balearic Islands and Galicia, is one of the regions or autonomous 
communities of Spain that has its own civil law, embodied in a 
civil code, which applies to the exclusion of the Spanish Civil 
Code within the Catalan territory.32 Spain is, therefore, a multi-
                                                                                                             
 30. This line of case law originates from the Supreme Court Judgment of 
Sept. 21, 1999, T.S., s. n. 776/1999. 
 31. The Civil Code of Catalonia is being promulgated in stages. The first 
Act or Preliminary Act was enacted in 2002 (Law 29/2002 C.C. CAT., Dec. 30, 
2002). At this time, the code is almost complete. Only Book VI, related to 
Obligations and Contracts, is missing and still in progress. The full text of the 
Civil Code of Catalonia is available in Spanish at 
http://civil.udg.es/normacivil/cat/CCC/ES/Index.htm (last visited May 5, 2013). 
 32. Art. 111-3.1 & 111-5 C.C. CAT. These provisions of the Civil Code of 
Catalonia show that, with respect to those civil matters over which the Catalan 
legislature has authority and which have been regulated by it, the law applicable 
in the territory of Catalonia is Catalan civil law. The Spanish Civil Code (1889) 
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legislative State in which a plurality of territorial civil laws exists. 
However, there are certain civil matters which are governed by a 
uniform civil law, since they are reserved to the legislative 
authority of the State and, accordingly, forbidden to the territorial 
legislative powers. Relevant provisions are found in article 149.1, 
rule 8, of the Spanish Constitution (Constitución Española).33 
B. The New Book II, Of Persons and Family, the Civil Code of 
Catalonia: Its Regulation of Matrimonial Regimes 
With regards to family law, the Constitution grants to the State 
of Spain the exclusive power to legislate on the form of the 
marriage celebration and the capacity to marry. Therefore, 
although it aims at the complete regulation of family law,34 Book 
                                                                                                             
 
is, in turn, applicable to those territories of the State which do not have their 
own civil law. In addition, in certain civil matters (referred to in art. 13.1 C.C.), 
it is the common or uniform code that is applicable in of all the territories of the 
State, including those who have a special civil law. 
 33. Art. 149.1 of the Constitución Española [hereinafter C.E.] establishes 
those matters which can only be regulated by the State of Spain, and 
accordingly, those which are forbidden to the legislative authority of the 
autonomous communities or regions of Spain. Thus, matters not included in this 
list may be regulated by an autonomous or regional legislature. Although art. 
149.1, rule 8, C.E. also reserves to the State “civil legislation”, that same rule 
recognizes the legislative power of certain Spanish regions for the 
“conservation, modification, and development” of their own civil law. Even so, 
art. 149.1, rule 8, C.E. provides that certain matters are also exclusively reserved 
to the legislative authority of the State and may not, therefore, be included in the 
territorial or regional civil laws. Among those civil matters reserved to the State, 
art. 149.1, rule 8, C.E. includes the “grounds of contractual obligations,” a 
limitation that has been much discussed by the State as well as by the regional 
powers before the Spanish Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court (for 
instance, in judgment 71/1982, Nov. 30, 1982) stated that with this limit the 
intent is to preserve the unity of the market within Spanish territory. This limit 
would play, therefore, a similar role as the commerce clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8) which, in the United States Constitution, limits the competence of States in 
matters of private law. 
 34. In addition, the Civil Code of Catalonia strives toward regulation 
adapted to new models of family (for example, single-parent families), as 
established by art. 231-1, which, significantly, bears the heading “the 
heterogeneity in the family.” According to this provision, “The family enjoys 
legal protection provided by law, protecting without discrimination family 
relationships arising from marriage or stable cohabitation in couples, and 
families formed by a single parent with his/her descendants.” 
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II of the Civil Code of Catalonia must be enacted without those 
matters upon which the Catalan Legislature is forbidden to take 
legislative action.  
One of the issues that, in Catalonia, has its own regulation 
distinct from the Spanish Civil Law relates to “matrimonial 
agreements”, which are contracts between spouses or between 
persons who will contract a future marriage in order to regulate the 
economic regime of the marriage. 
Although there were obstacles to grant matrimonial agreements 
in Spanish law until 1975 (until that date the Spanish Civil Code 
prevented the execution of post-nuptial agreements, because of 
possible psychological influence of the husband over the wife),35 
in Catalonia, vast autonomy has always existed to grant 
matrimonial agreements, allowing them both prior to and after the 
celebration of the marriage. Moreover, the content of the 
agreements has been and continues to be very broad. In Catalonia, 
beyond the choice of the economic regime, these agreements have 
been intended to articulate everything related to the whole regime 
applicable to the community of family life. Thus, as detailed 
below, matrimonial agreements are not unitary transactions, but 
rather a group of transactions (i.e., a set of multiple transactions 
and statements).  
The primary, but not the only, purpose of the matrimonial 
agreement is to determine the “matrimonial economic regime,” 
which can either be of separate property or of community property; 
only the latter creates the existence of common marital property. In 
Catalonia, in the absence of a consensus between the contracting 
parties or spouses in the agreement, the matrimonial economic 
regime is that of separate property, as provided by law.36 However, 
                                                                                                             
 35. As reflected in the Statement of Purpose (§ IV) of Law 14/1975 of May 
2, which amended the Spanish Civil Code to eliminate restrictions on a married 
woman’s legal capacity; B.O.E. n. 107, May 5, 1975. 
 36. Art. 231-10.2 C.C. CAT. On the contrary, in Spanish law, in the absence 
of a regime chosen by the parties themselves in the matrimonial agreement, the 
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the agreement on the economic regime is not the only content of 
the matrimonial agreement. On the contrary, it is common that the 
contracting parties (the persons who intend to contract marriage, if 
the agreement is pre-nuptial), or the spouses (in a post-nuptial 
agreement or an agreement concluded after the marriage 
ceremony), may waive that part of the agreement and maintain the 
regime of separate property already provided by law, since that is 
the one best in keeping with the current social reality (the full 
integration of women into the labor market and, accordingly, of 
their economic autonomy). 
Thus, in Catalonia, the agreements tend to be designed to 
mitigate the effects of the separation of property, permitting a 
certain connection between the personal patrimonies of both 
spouses. The principal means for achieving this has been by 
mutual donations which, for reason of marriage or future marriage, 
the contracting parties or spouses make, either between themselves 
or in favor of their—usually—future descendants. For the same 
nuptial reasons, donations may also be made by third parties 
(usually, the relatives of one or either of the contracting parties or 
spouses) to the contracting couple or their future descendants. 
Indeed, at times the object of these donations is not only specific 
property, but is, rather, a universality: applied to all or part of the 
patrimony of the donor, who, at the time of the donation, 
irrevocably institutes as heir the son or daughter who marries 
and/or his or her future descendants. In the latter case, we are 
dealing with the heretament or successoral contract37 which up to 
                                                                                                             
 
matrimonial property regime shall be one of community property, which 
involves the creation of a common patrimony of the spouses (art. 1316 C.C.). 
 37. Indeed, the heretament or typical successoral contract in Catalan civil 
law requires kinship between the contracting parties (art. 431-2, C.C. CAT.). 
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this point was necessary to include in the instrument of the 
matrimonial agreement.38 
Aside from that specific type of heretament or successoral 
contract, the remarkable thing is that, by the fact they are included 
in the instrument of matrimonial agreement, donations for reason 
of marriage are more binding than ordinary donations. They are 
non-revocable on a variety of causes that ordinarily39 make it 
permissible for the donor to revoke them unilaterally (e.g., by the 
subsequent birth of a child) after donation. Rather, donations 
contained in the matrimonial agreement are revocable only on a 
single ground: the failure by the donor to perform a charge 
stipulated in the act of donation to the benefit of the donee-
spouse.40 The reason for this provision is the legal assumption that 
these kinds of donations are not strictly gratuitous or exclusively 
intended to benefit the donee. On the contrary, the law assumes 
that all donations contained in the instrument of matrimonial 
agreement have been made correspondingly or in recognition of 
the attributions made in turn by one contracting party or their 
family to the benefit of the other contracting party or their 
relatives. They are, therefore, mutual and reciprocal attributions. It 
is precisely that quasi-onerous or reciprocal character peculiar to 
donations in the marital agreement that determines the restriction 
of the unilateral power to revoke or leave them without effect.  
Another provision related to this rule is article 231-23, 
concerning the modifications of the marital agreement. When, in 
addition to the contracting parties, third parties (i.e., relatives who 
make donations on behalf of the spouses or their descendants) have 
participated in the marital agreement, the agreement may only be 
amended with the participation of all persons involved in its initial 
formation. The only declaration in the agreement which does not 
                                                                                                             
 38. Currently, the Catalan Civil Code allows the heretament to be recorded 
in a deed or notarized document that is not a matrimonial agreement (art. 431-7 
C.C. CAT.). 
 39. Art. 531-15 C.C. CAT. 
 40. Art. 231-25 C.C. CAT. 
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require unanimous modification is the agreement on the choice of 
the economic regime: the spouses are free during the marriage to 
modify the economic regime established at the time of the 
marriage contract. However, since the amendment can be used to 
defraud the rights of creditors of either spouse,41 such modification 
shall be enforced against them only from the date of its publication 
in the Civil Registry.42 
As mentioned above, the content of the matrimonial agreement 
is not limited to setting up the economic regime of marriage, but, 
because it may be comprehensive, it may be used to regulate 
various issues raised by the community of marital life. Although, 
traditionally, the content of the agreement has been eminently 
patrimonial or economic, current regulation does not preclude the 
inclusion of strictly personal marital or family issues.43 
Furthermore, it seems that the current Catalan Civil Law is even 
favorable to such a possibility, given its purpose to provide non-
judicial means to solve family conflicts, attempting to resolve them 
within the family’s own sphere by the agreement of the parties 
themselves.44 Therefore, there could also be a place in the 
agreement for stipulations of a personal nature, such as marital 
agreements relating to the exercise of parental authority,45 the 
                                                                                                             
 41. For instance, matrimonial creditors might be disappointed in a reduced 
guarantee (the patrimony of the debtor), if the original matrimonial regime of 
community property is replaced by a separate property regime. 
 42. Art. 231-23.2 C.C. CAT. In addition, modification of the matrimonial 
agreement must be recorded in the Registry of Commerce if either of the 
spouses is a merchant or employer, as well as in the Land Registry, if one or 
both are the owner of immovable property. 
 43. Note that art. 231-19.1 C.C. CAT. allows including in the matrimonial 
agreement all lawful pacts that the contracting parties consider pertinent. 
 44. As established by art. 233-6 C.C. CAT., which includes family 
mediation in the case of marital crisis and, therefore, invites spouses at any stage 
of the proceedings to try to resolve their differences through consensus guided 
and managed by a professional mediator. 
 45. Art.236-9 C.C. CAT. allows, during cohabitation, the parents, whether 
married or not, to agree on different approaches to the exercise of parental 
authority, such as the exercise by only one of them with the consent of the other. 
 
 
416 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
recognition of a non-marital child of either spouse,46 or the 
husband's consent that, during his life, and even after his death, his 
wife can receive assistive (or in vitro) insemination using his 
reproductive material.  
Despite the potential scope of the content of the agreements, an 
impassable restriction is imposed on them legally, which is the 
respect for the equal rights and duties between the spouses. The 
application of such a restriction raises two issues: 
First, it is necessary to provide the restriction with a new 
meaning. Originally, this restriction intended to prevent 
discrimination on grounds of sex (particularly, discrimination 
against women) within the marriage. However, since in 2005,47 
when same-sex marriage became legal in Spain, the goal of 
equality between spouses must apply to both heterosexual and 
homosexual marital unions. Therefore, it is no longer intended to 
prevent only discrimination due to sex, but also on any other 
grounds of discrimination that, in a same-sex marriage, might arise 
from a certain diversification of roles. 
Second, it is questionable whether the indicated restriction 
permits the contracting parties or spouses to make an unequal 
distribution of marital rights and duties. Despite the above-
mentioned restriction, a myriad of specific rules of family law in 
Catalonia give rise to the possibility that an asymmetrical or 
unequal distribution of rights and duties agreed upon by the 
spouses themselves is legally supported.48  
                                                                                                             
 46. In fact, art. 231-26(a) already includes that kind of recognition as 
possible content of the matrimonial agreement. 
 47. Pursuant to Law 13/2005 of July 1, related to the right to marry, supra 
note 12. 
 48. Thus, for instance, reference should be made to art. 236-9 C.C. CAT., 
empowering parents to unevenly distribute between them functions inherent to 
parental authority, which may even include an agreement that such power will 
be exercised by one of the parents. In addition, spouses are allowed to confer on 
only one of them the management and disposition of common property (art. 
569-30). Also, in the case of dissolution of the matrimonial regime, the unequal 
distribution of earnings or common property is allowed in the agreement (art. 
232-15 – 232-38.1). Finally, without intending to be exhaustive, it should be 
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Now, given the strict requirement of reciprocity prevailing in 
the content of marital agreements,49 in order for that kind of 
agreement to be considered valid and effective, it should be 
verified that every disadvantage or individual renunciation has in 
return some other advantage or gained superiority for the spouse 
who assumes the disadvantage. Thus, this strict requirement of 
reciprocity shall be understood as synonymous with balance, and 
not as rigorously symmetrical or quantitatively equal. Furthermore, 
any kind of confusion or communication between the personal and 
patrimonial spheres should be prevented. For instance, a 
renunciation to exercise paternal authority made in exchange for a 
price or a patrimonial right should not be accepted.  
Under the terms and within the above-mentioned limits, nuptial 
or matrimonial agreements bearing unequal content should then be 
accepted. Because, since 1975,50 marriage no longer affects the 
legal capacity of the spouses, legislation, at the present stage of 
legal development, should have abandoned excessively protective 
attitudes, and should be limited to ensure that those entering into 
nuptial agreements do so under conditions of free will and 
informed consent. To this effect, according to Catalan 
jurisprudence, the ordinary rules to eradicate the vices of consent 
are sufficient.51 
                                                                                                             
 
noted that even those rules which in the event of matrimonial crisis aim to 
protect the most disadvantaged spouse, a waiver or agreement to the contrary is 
permitted. For a more detailed analysis, please see Juana Marco Molina, Los 
capítulos matrimoniales in 4 TRATADO DE DERECHO DE LA FAMILIA 181-212 
(M. Yzquierdo& M. Cuena eds., Aranzadi, Cizur Menor (Navarra) 2011). 
 49. Art. 231-20.3 C.C. CAT.: “The agreements [in anticipation of marital 
rupture] of exclusion or limitation of rights should have a reciprocal basis and 
clearly define the rights that are limited or waived.” 
 50. Since Law 14/1975, supra note 35, which reformed the Spanish Civil 
Code to remove previous restrictions on a married woman’s legal capacity. 
 51. In this regard, the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice of Catalonia 
of July 19, 2004, is particularly significant. The mentioned judgment recognized 
the validity of certain agreements in anticipation of marital rupture in which the 
wife renounced the use of marital home in favor of her husband. Pursuant to this 
decision (see the judgment’s 4th legal basis) such matrimonial agreement should 
be complied with because “it is an agreement between adults with full capacity   
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Finally, it should be noted that one of the most innovative 
features found in the matrimonial agreements are those agreements 
between the contracting parties or spouses in anticipation of a 
marital rupture.52 The Catalan Civil Code not only supports these 
agreements, which in Catalonia are binding on the contracting 
parties without court approval or endorsement,53 but also deals 
with the rules related to their formation and effectiveness, having 
been greatly influenced by American law; in particular, by the 
principles formulated by the American Law Institute relating to 
marital rupture.54 
For instance, a rule such as article 231-20.1 is derived from 
American law, which provides that the agreements in anticipation 
of marital rupture are only valid if they have been agreed upon at 
least 30 days prior to the celebration of the marriage. This rule, 
based on American jurisprudence,55 is an expression of legal 
protection of the contracting parties when matrimonial agreements 
are entered into too close to the date of the wedding, since it may 
                                                                                                             
 
. . . [wherein] the parties cannot be detached . . . since that agreement binds 
them, as it is the case with any contract.” It was sufficient to use the rules on 
vices of consent to verify that the spouse at a patrimonial disadvantage signed 
the agreement of their own free will and with informed consent; T.S.J. Cataluña, 
s. n. 23/2004. 
 52. According to art. 231-20.1 C.C. CAT., it can be included either in the 
notarized instrument of matrimonial agreement or in a notarized document 
independent and disassociated from the matrimonial agreement. 
 53. In contrast, the Spanish Civil Code only confers efficacy to matrimonial 
agreements regulating the effects of separation, divorce, and annulment of 
marriage after they have been reviewed and signed by the judge, before whom 
these cases of matrimonial crisis are presented (art. 90.2 C.C.). 
The difference between the Catalan and the Spanish regulation is certainly due 
to the above-mentioned purpose of the Catalan Civil Code to provide non-
judicial solutions for family conflicts and promote as much as possible a 
resolution by agreement between the parties concerned. Even so, there are 
certain matters for which the Civil Code of Catalonia maintains judicial control. 
Therefore, art. 233-5.3 C.C. CAT., subjects to judicial review the agreement on 
the custody of and relationship with the child, as well as regarding the child 
support that should be provided to them after the marital rupture, in order to 
verify if these agreements are in accordance with the best interest of the child. 
 54. AMER. LAW INST. (ALI), PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002). 
 55. See id. at 966. 
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increase the risk of intimidation where one of the parties threatens 
not to marry the other party if the latter does not endorse the 
proposed prenuptial agreement.  
Unlike the remaining provisions of the agreements, which, if 
prenuptial, enter into force on the date of the marriage,56 the 
agreements in anticipation of rupture only become binding when 
and if the regulated situation occurs—that being the rupture of the 
marriage. It may be that, when the rupture occurs, such agreements 
are no longer suitable to adequately address an unforeseen 
subsequent event and circumstances very different from those that 
surrounded the agreement. For that reason, the Civil Code of 
Catalonia permits the injured spouse to challenge it by showing 
that an unforeseeable and unpredictable change occurred regarding 
circumstances relevant at the time the agreement was made.57 
Even without naming it as such, article 231-20.5 brings into 
family matters an institution as strictly patrimonial as the rebus sic 
stantibus, typical of synallagmatic or bilateral contracts, which 
impose reciprocal benefits to the contracting parties. This is 
because, like in the donations discussed previously, the marital 
agreements, and in particular those in anticipation of rupture58 
contained in the marital agreements, tend to be linked by strong 
ties of interdependence or reciprocity thus justifying the 
application of that clause. Accordingly, the promise, renunciation, 
or attribution that is carried out by one of the parties in favor of the 
other can be maintained only if the circumstances at the time of the 
execution of the agreement continue to support the continuous 
justification of the reciprocal promise or concession made by the 
other party. 
Despite the aforementioned influence of the passage of time 
and the consequent change of circumstances to the effectiveness of 
the agreements in anticipation of rupture, it is necessary to 
                                                                                                             
 56. Art. 231-19.2 C.C. CAT. 
 57. Art. 231-20.5 C.C. CAT. 
 58. Art. 231-20.3 C.C. CAT. 
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emphasize that the agreements that were formed after the marital 
rupture has occurred are weaker than those formed before the 
marital rupture, despite the fact that they are more recent; thus, it is 
recognized that each one of the spouses has the right to unilaterally 
withdraw from them.59 Indeed, underlying the rule is the legal 
recognition that post-rupture agreements are usually made in a 
moment of particular emotional distress.  
IV. CONTRACT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSE TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
Regarding the law of contract and the law of property rights, 
the main legislative developments have been directly related to the 
financial crisis that Spain has faced since 2008, particularly by the 
most economically vulnerable strata of society. During this period, 
hundreds of thousands of people,60 most of them unemployed,61 
have been evicted from their homes because they found it 
impossible to fulfill the contracted obligations assumed in order to 
finance the acquisition of immovable property. 
The financial crisis created an urgent imperative for public 
intervention,62 which was necessarily translated into the adoption 
                                                                                                             
 59. Precisely, such unilateral right to withdraw exists when the spouse who 
wants to exercise it signed the agreement without independent legal counsel 
(Art. 233-5.2 C.C. CAT.). 
 60. According to Reuters, an estimated 400,000 properties have been 
repossessed between 2008 and 2012; www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/15/us-
spain-evictions-idUSBRE8AE10A20121115 (last visited Aug. 8, 2013). 
 61. According to estimates made by the government itself, the number of 
unemployed people in Spain for the first quarter of 2012 hovers around 23% of 
the labor force, reaching almost 50% for those age 25 and younger. Moreover, 
such as is recognized in one of the legal provisions that I discuss later, this 
situation of unemployment very often affects all members of the family, as thus 
recognized by art. 3.1(a) of Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 of March 9, concerning 
urgent measures for the protection of mortgagors without resources; B.O.E. n. 
60, Mar. 10, 2012). 
 62. The regulation itself is motivated by this state of affairs, recognizing 
without reservation the seriousness of the situation. Thus, for instance, the 
penultimate paragraph of Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 , supra note 61, states that:  
The adoption of the measures referred to in this Royal Decree-Law is 
essential in order to protect a social group in a situation of special 
vulnerability in the economic context generated by the crisis. The 
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of laws. In Spain, unlike in common law countries, the legal 
system does not allow courts to create a law without statutory 
support.63 Judicial attempts to remedy this situation by 
interpretation, even forcibly, have been ultimately proven to be 
insufficient in the current legal framework, as well as dangerous to 
the legal security and the necessary social confidence that 
contractual obligations will be performed: pacta sunt servanda 
(“agreements must be kept”). 
When analyzing the legal measures taken, it is therefore 
essential to take into account the socio-economic context 
mentioned above. The same context of urgency and necessity also 
justifies the fact that the main measures have been taken, not by 
Spanish Parliament (Las Cortes Generales), but directly by the 
Executive Branch, which for reasons of extraordinary urgency and 
necessity, may issue regulatory provisions which have the force of 
law: the decree-law.64 After its promulgation by the Executive 
Branch, it must be ratified by the Parliament,65 which has to 
determine whether the actual circumstances existing at that time 
justified such extraordinary provisions. 
A. Contract Law: Labor Reform 
In the area of contract law, the most significant measure was 
the “labor reform”, undertaken by Royal Decree-Law 3/2012 of 
                                                                                                             
 
effects of unemployment on Spanish families and their social situation 
have produced damage for which government intervention cannot be 
further delayed. . . . 
 63. In Spain, the judges are not bound by precedent (our system does not 
recognize the principle of stare decisis), but, as stated in art. 117.1 C.E., judges 
are bound solely by legislation (imperio de la ley). The jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court is not, therefore, a source of law or legal norm under Spanish 
law, but only has persuasive interpretative value (art. 1.6 C.C.) and is a guide for 
probable future determination, but is neither certain nor immutable for future 
litigation. 
 64. Art. 86 C.E. 
 65. The ratification, which must be made within 30 days of the 
promulgation of the decree-law, falls within the authority of the Congreso de los 
Diputados, which is the lower House in the Spanish Parliament. 
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February 10,66 containing urgent measures for the reform of the 
labor market. This provision, which first and foremost seeks to 
combat unemployment, introduces flexible modifications aimed at 
regulating the employment contract in order to encourage small 
and medium-sized companies to hire workers.  
This flexibility was undoubtedly necessary, since the rigidity of 
the labor law framework has been identified as one of the main 
reasons for the high rate of unemployment in Spain. This is 
because Spanish labor law (primarily contained in “The Workers’ 
Statute”)67 is still very attached to the achievements of the labor 
movement in the beginning of the 20th century and is, therefore, 
extremely protective of the rights of workers, often to the 
detriment of the employer, who desires the ability to adapt in order 
to serve the financial needs of the company. 
Hence, the above-mentioned legislative reform provides 
flexibility and acceleration of the possible renegotiation of 
individual employment contracts, especially concerning the causes 
and consequences of dismissal, even to the detriment of collective 
agreements (i.e., contracts between a trade union and the group of 
companies in a certain sector of economic activity), which so far 
have predetermined the conditions that could be agreed upon 
individually between workers and companies in that sector.  
The most notable changes caused by the Royal Decree-Law 
3/2012 with regard to the previous legal framework are as follows: 
1. First, as a main instrument for flexibility in hiring, and at the 
same time for the promotion of employment, it creates a new form 
of employment contract of indefinite duration that can only be used 
by companies with fewer than fifty workers.68 This category of 
                                                                                                             
 66. Royal Decree-Law 3/2012, B.O.E. n. 36, Feb. 11, 2012. 
 67. Royal Decree-Law 1/1995 of March 24, approving the consolidated 
Workers’ Statute [Estatuto de los Trabajadores, hereinafter E.T.], B.O.E. n. 75, 
Mar. 29, 1995. 
 68. It is taken into account that small and medium-sized enterprises (called 
“PYMES”—pequeñas y medianas empresas), which represent the majority of 
Spanish production, suffer the consequences of the economic crisis with greater 
intensity. 
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companies is allowed to hire workers for an indefinite time by 
subjecting them to a trial period longer than the ordinary trial 
period. While the ordinary trial period is six months,69 in this new 
type of contract, in the favor of small enterprises, the probationary 
period is extended to one year.70 Within that period, both the 
employee and the company may unilaterally terminate the contract 
without justification or cause, or payment of additional 
compensation for termination. Additionally, the companies are 
entitled to tax incentives when workers are under the age of thirty 
or unemployed persons registered at the Employment Office. 
2. Second, the new legislation brings two new substantial 
changes with regards to dismissal: 
a. The first change consists of a broader consideration of the 
possible causes of dismissal, especially the “objective dismissal”, 
which is founded on “economic, technical, organizational or 
production causes.” At the same time, this also applies to collective 
dismissals, which must impact at least 10% of the workers in the 
company.71 
Particularly significant is the dismissal on economic causes or 
based on the performance of the company. It is deemed that those 
“economic causes”72 are present where the performance of the 
company shows a negative economic situation, in cases such as 
current losses and anticipated losses or a persistent decrease in 
their level of income or sales. In this regard, two aspects should be 
stressed: First, based on the intention to facilitate the ability of the 
company to act in such circumstances, even though there is still ex 
post judicial review to determine the veracity of such 
circumstances, the company is exempt from obtaining approval 
from the administrative authority, which, until now, had to 
                                                                                                             
 69. Art. 14 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66. 
 70. Art. 4 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66. 
 71. Art. 18, para. 2 & 3, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, amending Arts. 51 
& 52 E.T., supra note 67. 
 72. Art. 51 E.T., supra note 67. 
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authorize this type of dismissal.73Second, although the formulation 
of the reasons for dismissal does not vary substantially from the 
previous legislation, the previous references to the reasonableness 
and the prospects for success of the measure are eliminated from 
the provision74 in order to ensure that the courts will look at only 
the existence of the cause and refrain from making judgments 
relating to the management of the business, as they had done on 
previous occasions. 
Another modification related to those mentioned above—
whose effectiveness has yet to be proven is that in counterpart to 
the broad and flexible causes for dismissal, the provision at the 
same time prevents dismissal by granting greater freedom to the 
companies to unilaterally modify the conditions of work.75 Thus, 
for instance, they are allowed to modify essential contractual terms 
such as the wage amount, distribution of working hours, 
geographic relocation and even functional reallocation of 
workers.76 Moreover, such unilateral modifications are also 
allowed without prior administrative authorization. Above all, the 
company may also make changes contrary to conditions previously 
set in the collective agreement applicable to the sector to which the 
company belongs.77 
b. The second change consists in trying to reduce the economic 
cost of dismissal for companies, also known as “low-cost 
dismissal.”78 Thus, for contracts concluded after the Royal Decree-
Law entered into force, in the case of individual dismissal (when it 
                                                                                                             
 73. Art. 13 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, amending Art. 47 E.T., supra 
note 67. 
 74. Art. 51.1 E.T., supra note 67. 
 75. Arts. 8 & 12 R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, which reorganized arts. 22, 
39 & 41 E.T., supra note 67. 
 76. That functional reallocation or unilateral power exercised by the 
company to change the functions or tasks of the worker includes even the 
possibility to assign to him or her lower-skilled functions than those 
corresponding to the professional group to which the worker belongs. 
 77. Art. 14, para.1, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, amending art. 82.3 E.T., 
supra note 67. 
 78. In Spanish, “abaratamiento”, a term used in social media. 
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is unfair or unjustified), the current severance payment of forty-
five days’ salary per year of service is replaced by a severance 
payment of thirty-three days’ salary per year of service, to be paid 
in installments over a maximum period of twenty-four months.79 In 
contrast, with collective dismissal on economic or any other 
objective cause, the severance payment will be, as a general rule, 
of twenty days’ salary per year of service, and may be paid in a 
maximum of twelve monthly installments.80 
3. Lastly, the labor reform emphasizes the importance, as 
mentioned above, to ensure that individual employment contracts, 
as well as specific collective agreements of each company, prevail 
over sectorial or professional agreements between Trade Unions 
and employers of a particular sector. The legislature presents this 
measure as an attempt to further “conventional decentralization in 
order to facilitate the negotiation of working conditions at the 
closest, most appropriate level to the actual circumstances of the 
company and its employees.”81 Naturally, from the unions’ point 
of view, these kinds of measures are seen as an attack on the 
bargaining power of the labor representatives, to the detriment of 
the requisite bargaining power of the workers themselves.  
In any case, the main changes in this area have basically been 
as follows: 
a. It is possible to modify or revise a sectorial collective 
agreement during its period of performance, thus changing the 
agreement’s previous stability until the next negotiation. Now, 
however, article 86.1 E.T.82 allows either party (employees’ 
representatives or employers’ representatives) to push for its 
renegotiation. 
                                                                                                             
 79. Art. 18, para.7, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, modifying art. 56.1 E.T., 
supra note 67. 
 80. Art. 53.1(b) E.T., supra note 67. 
 81. As per the Statement of Purpose, para. IV, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 
66. 
 82. Modified by art. 14, para. 5, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66. 
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b. Second, the survival of the collective agreement is 
abolished; until now the law provided that, after the maximum 
time allowed to negotiate has expired without reaching an 
agreement, the collective agreement remains in force indefinitely. 
Now, however, two years after the denunciation of the collective 
agreement by either party, without having reached a new 
agreement or being issued an arbitral award, the denounced 
agreement would no longer be valid.83 
c. Finally, in order to facilitate the decentralization of 
collective bargaining already mentioned above,84 it is established, 
for the first time, that the company agreement takes precedence 
over the sectorial collective agreement,85 providing the company 
the flexibility to adapt working conditions to economic and 
organizational needs, as well as to the changing market situation. 
B. Property Rights Law: “Giving in Payment” or Allowance for 
Alternative Satisfaction86 Granted to the Debtor Who Loses His 
House in a Foreclosure Proceeding 
One of the most-debated issues of 2011 is the so-called “giving 
in payment,”87 meaning that the debtor who gave his immovable 
property (usually his own house) to the creditor as a mortgage can 
be released from the obligation (or obligations resulting from the 
mortgage loan contracted for the acquisition of that property) if the 
mortgage property is adjudicated to the mortgage creditor. Such an 
adjudication takes place when, in the course of the foreclosure 
proceeding, the sale by public auction of the object of the 
guarantee is not completed due to a lack of bidders or interested 
                                                                                                             
 83. Art. 14, para. 6, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, modifying art. 86.3 
E.T., supra note 67. 
 84. As mentioned both in the previous paragraph 2 and at the beginning of 
this paragraph 3. 
 85. Art. 14, para. 3, R.D.-L. 3/2012, supra note 66, modifying art. 84.2 
E.T., supra note 67. 
 86. In Spanish, “la facultad solutoria alternativa.” 
 87. As we shall see, the use of the term “giving in payment” (dación en 
pago) in the context of this reform is technically inaccurate. 
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persons.88 In this event, according to Spanish Procedural Law,89 
the creditor may request the court to adjudicate the mortgaged 
property to him.  
Such adjudication does not extinguish the obligation or 
obligations secured by the mortgage. Instead, according to Spanish 
law, the creditor may continue to claim from the debtor the portion 
of the debt that is not satisfied (i.e., remains unpaid) after the sale 
of the adjudicated immovable property. This means that since the 
foreclosure does not alter the unlimited personal liability of the 
debtor,90 the creditor may continue to try to collect the amount due 
(the unsatisfied debt) from the debtor’s remaining assets.91 
Thus, it has become a widespread and socially criticized 
practice that, after the adjudication of the property at a price that 
may be well-below the appraised value of the mortgaged property 
assigned by the creditor and stated in the mortgage contract,92 the 
creditor (usually a bank) then gets an additional benefit by 
transferring the property to a third party while still claiming the 
amount of the outstanding debt from the debtor, who is typically an 
unemployed person who has lost his house precisely because of the 
lack of income needed to satisfy the obligations arising from the 
mortgage loan taken in order to purchase the property.  
                                                                                                             
 88. Very often, auctions of immovables are deserted due to rampant falling 
prices in the Spanish real estate market, which, on the one hand, has been 
overwhelmed by the excessive construction activity of the previous two decades, 
and, on the other hand, by a lack of liquidity because of the general situation of 
indebtedness of individuals and companies. 
 89. Law 1/2000 of January 7, the Law of Civil Procedure (Ley de 
Enjuiciamiento Civil), referred to as L.E.C., B.O.E. n. 7, Jan. 8, 2000. 
 90. The Mortgage Law [Ley Hipotecaria, hereinafter L.H.], consolidated 
pursuant to the Decree of February 8, 1946. Art. 105 L.H. states that “The 
mortgage . . . will not alter the unlimited personal liability of the debtor provided 
in art. 1911 of the Civil Code.” B.O.E. n. 58, Feb. 27, 1946. 
 91. According to art. 1911 C.C., “the debtor is liable for the performance of 
his obligations with all his property, present and future.” 
 92. The mortgage contract has to be formalized in an authentic act or 
instrument before a notary in order for this right to be created or exist (art. 1875 
C.C.). 
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This situation, although protected by the law in force,93 has not 
only raised widespread social criticism for being incomprehensible 
to common citizens, but has also led to attempts to put an end to 
the problem by way of certain judicial decisions from lower courts. 
Thus, decisions such as those of the Court of First Instance of 
Lleida, December 29, 2011; of the Provincial Court of Girona, 
September 16, 2011; and above all, of the Provincial Court of 
Navarra, December 17, 2010 (which has had the greatest social 
impact), describe the conduct of the banks as “abuse of rights,” “an 
anti-social exercise,” or “an excess of authority”94 regarding the 
rights derived from the mortgage.95 Consequently, the courts deny 
the right of the creditor bank to pursue the collection of the 
outstanding amount of the mortgage on the remaining assets of the 
mortgagor.96 These cited decisions reinforce the line of argument 
                                                                                                             
 93. In the already-cited art. 105 L.H. and art. 1911 C.C. 
 94. Article 7.2 C.C. 
 95. Indeed, art. 7.2. C.C. prohibits abuse of rights, antisocial exercise or 
excess of authority as follows:  
The law does not support abuse of rights or antisocial exercise thereof. 
Any act or omission which, as a result of the author’s intention, its 
purpose or the circumstances in which it is performed manifestly 
exceeds the normal limits to exercise a right, with damage to a third 
party, shall give rise to the corresponding compensation and the 
adoption of judicial or administrative measures preventing persistence 
in such abuse. 
 96. As stated in the resolution of the Court of First Instance No. 5 of Lleida, 
December 29, 2011, ejecución hipotecaria 1895/2009 (which corresponds with 
other judicial decisions referred to in the text):  
. . . [W]e must not forget that when the Bank granted the loan, it valued 
the property or estate at €219,242.55, and now intends to incorporate it 
into their assets for a value of €109,621.28, and to continue the 
enforcement process on the other assets of the debtors . . . la doctrina 
de los actos propios (compare with the doctrine of estoppel) applies 
here. If the bank, the dominant party in the contract of adhesion with 
the borrower, appraised the mortgaged property at a certain amount, it 
cannot then, if it does not want to contravene the above-mentioned 
doctrine, which has been repeatedly applied by jurisprudence, 
incorporate as its own the auctioned property without giving it the 
value that [the creditor bank] itself set. One of the foundations of this 
jurisprudential trend is the application of art. 7 of the Civil Code . . . 
because it is understood that the incorporation of this patrimonial asset 
at a lower value to which the party has acknowledged, and intends to 
continue the enforcement process, presumes an abuse of rights by the 
creditor . . . and allows an unjust enrichment of the Bank. Because the 
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that judgments should reflect the current economic and social 
reality, since, in effect, pursuant to article 3.1 of the Spanish Civil 
Code, “The law will be interpreted . . . according to the social 
reality at the time they should be applied. . . .” 
Indeed, in view of the current economic situation of the 
country, judgments such as that the aforementioned Court of 
Lleida state that:  
[T]he 2011 economic outlook has nothing to do with the 
economic outlook of 2006, 2007 and 2008 when the crisis 
was still emerging. Nowadays, the Spanish economy, as 
well as the world economy, suffers a deep economic crisis 
and for this reason, surely, the property adjudicated to the 
bank . . . now has a market value below the price agreed in 
the mortgage loan, but is it fair that the debtor suffers all 
the consequences of this fall? Would it not be fairer that the 
financial institutions also bear part of this decline? 
Economists are unanimous in considering that the real 
estate value losses have been caused by the financial 
institutions themselves with their mismanagement of the 
financial system. Hence, if the laws should be interpreted 
according to the reality at the time when they are applied 
(article 3 of the Spanish Civil Code) . . . [it] is not 
acceptable that the stronger party in the mortgage loan 
contract obtains an unjustified benefit with the further 
execution at the expense of the debtor as a consequence of 
applying the legal rules which aim to obtain 
reimbursement, not enrichment, of the creditor. . . .97 
However, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court98 rejects that 
judicial approach because it holds that if the foreclosure 
proceeding has been followed according to the legal procedure,99 it 
                                                                                                             
 
purpose of foreclosure is to obtain for the creditor, with the auction of 
the property, the collection of the outstanding debt, but not to obtain an 
unjust benefit such as that when the mortgaged property is acquired at a 
lower price than the value fixed by the parties . . . and continue the 
enforcement process on the other assets of the debtors. 
 97. The resolution of the Court of First Instance No. 5 of Lleida, December 
29, 2011, ejecución hipotecaria 1895/2009. 
 98. In particular, the judgment of the Supreme Court of February 16, 2006, 
in its 5th legal basis; T.S., s. n. 128/2006. 
 99. Art. 131 L.H. 
 
 
430 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
does not constitute an abuse of rights by the mortgagee to exercise 
the rights conferred by law in order to obtain admissible economic 
benefits in those transactions. In addition, the Court holds that 
preventing the mortgagee from exercising those rights would 
undermine the general confidence in the performance of 
contractual obligations. 
Moreover, even the Constitutional Court, in its Decision 
113/2011 of August 17, 2011, censured such a judicial approach, 
holding that those judges, critical of the use of the rules for 
foreclosure proceedings, exceed their interpretative role and force 
the existing legal framework, which, in a system of law such as 
that of Spain, can only be modified by the legislature, as the 
Constitutional Court also noted. 
Perhaps that is the reason why the legislature itself100 
eventually decided to intervene in order to try to remedy, or at least 
alleviate, the severity of the above-mentioned social-economic 
situation. The measures taken are twofold: 
1. First, the Royal Decree-Law 8/2011 of July 1,101 concerning 
measures in support of mortgagors, which introduces two 
provisions: 
a. The aforementioned Law of Civil Procedure (L.E.C.) is 
modified to ensure that in foreclosure proceedings for default of 
payment, the debtor receives an adequate price for the immovable 
property that allows him to minimize the remaining debt. This 
way, in modifying article 671 L.E.C., it is anticipated that the 
adjudication to the creditor of a mortgaged property as a result of a 
foreclosure proceeding will never be at a price of less than 60% of 
its appraised value. 
b. The threshold or legal limit of that which is exempt from 
seizure is raised. Usually, the general minimum value of what is 
                                                                                                             
 100. In fact, the executive branch itself uses its exceptional power to 
proclaim Decree-Laws, which, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, have the 
rank of law even though these decrees are issued by the executive power. 
 101. B.O.E. n. 161, Jul. 7, 2011. 
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unseizable for any debtor coincides with the minimum wage.102 
Then, for mortgagors who have lost their habitual place of 
residence, this Royal Decree-Law raises the legal limit up to 150% 
of the minimum wage, and an additional 30% for each member of 
their family who does not receive income exceeding this minimum 
wage.103 
2. Subsequently, the Royal Decree-Law 6/2012 of March 9, 
concerning urgent measures for the protection of mortgagors 
without resources, seeks to curtail the social problem of evictions 
of people who have lost their housing in a foreclosure proceeding 
by means of establishing a voluntary system of mortgage debt 
renegotiation. This system consists in the introduction of a “Code 
of Good Practice,”104 which can be voluntarily adopted105 by 
financial institutions (banks and other savings institutions). It is 
not, therefore, an imperative measure, but merely a voluntary 
measure or soft law. Even so, the executive branch is confident that 
the majority of banks will adhere to the “Code,” both for reasons 
of professional prestige (the government would publish a list of 
participating institutions),106 and, above all, to gain a competitive 
position in the market. 
The measure is not created for the benefit of any mortgagor, 
but rather to favor those who, in accordance with the guidelines 
established by the Royal Decree-Law, can be considered 
particularly vulnerable, due to the suffering of extraordinary 
difficulty, to satisfy the payment of their mortgage obligations.107 
Article 3.1 of the Royal Decree-Law considers the debtor of a loan 
secured with a mortgage on his habitual place of residence to be in 
                                                                                                             
 102. In May 2013, the minimum wage was €645 per month; 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2013/05/31/inenglish/1370013481_405760.html. 
 103. Art. 1, R.D.-L. 8/2001, supra note 101. 
 104. The content of the Code of Good Practice is established in the Annex of 
R.D.-L. 6/2012; B.O.E. n. 60, Mar. 10, 2012. 
 105. Art. 5, R.D.-L. 6/2012, supra note 104. 
 106. Art. 5.3, R.D.-L. 6/2012, supra note 104. 
 107. Art. 1, R.D.-L. 6/2012, supra note 104. 
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such a vulnerable situation when all the following circumstances 
are met: 
a. That all members of the family unit108 lack income derived 
from work or economic activities. 
b. That the mortgage payment109 is greater than 60% of the net 
income received by all the members of the family unit. 
c. That all the members of the family unit lack sufficient 
property rights or any other property to satisfy the debt. 
d. That the credit or loan is secured with a mortgage on the 
only house owned by the debtor, and has been granted for its 
acquisition.  
Hence, mortgagors who establish (by means of the 
documentation indicated in article 3.1) that they are in such a 
situation may request the following from the lending bank: 
1. First, a novation or modification of the contract110 leading to 
a restructuring of the mortgage debt that makes its performance 
viable by the debtor in the medium and long term. It is necessary 
that the restructuring plan include111 a four-year grace period on 
the repayment of the capital, an extension of the loan repayment 
term of up to 40 years, and a reduction in the rate of interest 
applicable, which, during the grace period, will be determined 
according to the Euribor index + 0.25%. 
2. After applying these conditions, even if the mortgagor is 
able to pay, he may ask the lending institution for a remission or 
reduction of the capital to be repaid, which, at the choice of the 
                                                                                                             
 108. Persons considered as belonging to the family, in addition to the debtor, 
are his or her spouse or partner registered as such in a public register, and the 
children who reside in the house, regardless of their age (art. 3.1(a), R.D.-L. 
6/2012, supra note 104). 
 109. This is the debt resulting from the mortgage loan, which requires 
periodic payments (e.g., monthly payments). 
 110. In fact, it is not a single contract, but two connected or related contracts: 
a contract of loan whose repayment is guaranteed with a mortgage on 
immovable property, and the contract establishing the mortgage, which is a real 
right. Typically, both contracts are formalized in the same instrument (a deed 
before a notary public); thus, it would include both the loan contract and the 
contract that establishes or creates the mortgage. 
 111. See para. 1(b) Code of Good Practice, supra note 104. 
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institution, can be 25% of the outstanding capital, or the amount 
paid in interest to that point, or a part of the value of the 
adjudication of the house. 
3. Finally, if the mortgagor does not accept these new 
conditions, he may unilaterally impose on the creditor bank the 
“giving in payment,” whereby the mortgagor demands that the 
bank accept the transfer of the mortgaged property in payment of 
the outstanding debt, which will then totally and definitely 
extinguish the obligation.112 Despite the fact that both the media as 
well as the general public call this option “giving in payment,” 
technically it is only giving in payment if the debt is extinguished 
by transferring an object that is different from the one which is 
owed,113 and occurs by agreement between the creditor and the 
debtor, simultaneously upon payment or performance.114 Since in 
this case, where no agreement exists, it is the debtor who 
unilaterally imposes the asset offered as satisfaction or payment to 
a performance (the transfer of the dwelling) different from the one 
which is due (the repayment of the loaned capital and interest), it is 
technically more accurate to refer to “unilateral allowance for 
satisfaction” provided by law to the debtor. 
Despite this kind of “giving” or transfer of ownership of the 
dwelling to the creditor bank, the debtor can request to remain 
therein as a tenant for a period of two years, paying as annual 
rental 3% of the total debt at the moment the giving in payment 
occurs.115 An additional protective measure to the mortgagor who 
loses ownership of his house is that he may unilaterally impose a 
rental relationship upon his former creditor and new owner of the 
dwelling. 
In a recent judgment of March 14, 2013, the European Court of 
Justice declared that Spanish legislation does not conform to 
                                                                                                             
 112. Paragraph 3, Code of Good Practice, supra note 104. 
 113. Or, more generally, through the completion of an act or performance 
different from that which was initially due. 
 114. Art. 1153 C.C. 
 115. Paragraph 3(c), Code of Good Practice, supra note 104. 
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European Union consumer protection law.116 It violates Directive 
93/13/EC of April 5, 1993, to the extent that it does not allow the 
debtor, in the course of mortgage enforcement proceedings, to 
argue that some clauses of the mortgage loan are unfair contract 
terms and have this question judicially determined before 
enforcement proceedings are concluded. The debtor may later on 
obtain compensation if the terms are found unfair by the court 
having jurisdiction to do so, but this court cannot stay the 
enforcement proceedings. To comply with the aforementioned 
European judgment, the Kingdom of Spain has enacted the Law 
1/2013, of May 14, 2013, amending both the Mortgage Law and 
the Law of Civil Procedure.  
V. EUROPEAN UNION LAW: THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Because Spain has been one of the Member States of the 
European Union since 1985, it is necessary to include in this 
assessment the major developments related to the implementation 
of European private law. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has 
consistently stated,117 European Union (EU) law does not 
constitute international law for the Member States of the EU, but, 
at least in certain aspects, the EU legal system can be considered 
part of the domestic law of the Member States. In particular, EU 
directives make the integration of the EU legal system into 
domestic law possible. The directives are provisions that only 
acquire normative or binding value when a Member State of the 
Union implements or transposes them into its domestic law, 
usually through the promulgation of legislation that incorporates 
the content of the directive.118 
                                                                                                             
 116. Case C-415/11, Mohamed Aziz v.Catalunyacaixa, 2013 O. J. (C141) 5. 
 117. Since the judgment of the Constitutional Court (Tribunal 
Constitucional) 165/1994, May 26, 1994. 
 118. Art. 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the 
consolidated version, consequent to the Treaty of Lisbon of December 13, 2007) 
leaves to the Member States the choice of the means of incorporating the 
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One of the subjects of private law that the European legislature 
has attempted to harmonize or provide a uniform regulation within 
the European Common Market is intellectual property, which 
raises several conflicts between holders of protected rights 
(particularly, authors or creators) and the users who are, 
substantially, those who exploit protected works by making them 
available to the public, but also private users. There are, indeed, 
certain private uses of protected works, such as private copying, 
which, because of their volume, also cause significant damage or 
loss of benefit to the authors.  
The European legislature has changed its approach to dealing 
with these kinds of conflicts, as reflected by the first set of 
directives adopted in the 1990s.119 At first, the European Union 
opted to reinforce the rights of users against the creators, and even 
went so far as to impose on the authors specific uses of their 
works, such as the transmission by cable, in a system of 
agreements very close to that of the common law system of 
mandatory licensing.120 However, since the beginning of the last 
decade, a change of legislative policy is taking place because the 
authorities of the EU have realized that the European market of 
cultural production can achieve competitiveness only by 
strengthening the rights of the creator against those of a distributor 
or exploiter. 
                                                                                                             
 
directive into their own domestic law. The Spanish legislature opted to 
incorporate the main directives on matters of private law (e.g., relating to 
consumer contracts) through provisions with the rank of law and not through 
mere administrative provisions. 
 119. Concerning EU policy in the area of intellectual property law at that 
time and the directives reflecting it, see Juana Marco Molina, J., El derecho de 
autor frente a la sociedad de la información, 2 REVISTA JUR. DE CAT. 367 
(1997). 
 120. See art. 9, Directive 93/83/EC on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite 
broadcasting and cable retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L248) 20-21. 
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That change of legislative policy in the area of intellectual 
property, in part due to the “Bangemann Report,”121 resulted in 
directive 2001/29/EC, May 22, 2001, on the harmonization of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society. Despite the conflicts arising from its application, its firm 
and definite position to strengthen the rights of the creator against 
the users of the works facilitates the task of the courts. Some recent 
judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), as well as some 
Spanish judicial decisions, reflect this position. 
A. The Question of Fair Compensation for Private Copying; ECJ 
Judgment of June 16, 2011: Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus 
Supplies Deutschland GmbH 
The aforementioned judgment resolves the dispute raised by a 
Dutch copyright management organization for a collective of 
authors (Stichting de Thuiskopie) brought against a German 
company (Opus Supplies) which sold, via the internet, blank media 
that targeted consumers in the Netherlands. Opus Supplies did not 
pay the private copying levy in either Holland or Germany, as 
provided for in article 5.2(b), directive 2001/29. The judgment 
ordered Opus Supplies to pay Stichting de Thuislopie for the loss 
of earnings due to the Dutch authors, for reason of non-payment of 
that levy. 
The recognition of the right to receive fair compensation needs 
to be justified because the copying or reproduction of protected 
works by a person for private (and non-profit) use is “free use” or 
does not require authorization from the right-holder of the work.122 
                                                                                                             
 121. It was a study conducted by a group of experts led by Martin 
Bangemann, who was EU Commissioner for Industrial Affairs, Information and 
Telecommunications Technologies during the 1990s. This report was submitted 
to the European Council on May 26, 1994. 
 122. Art. 5.2(b) Directive 2001/29/EC (2001 O.J. (L167) 16) authorizes 
Member States to exempt from the authorization of the author the 
“reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for 
ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial.” Making use of that 
authority recognized by European Union law to the Member States, Art. 31.2, 
Spanish Intellectual Property Law (R.D.-L. 1/1996 of April 12) excludes the 
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This is because, from the inception of intellectual property 
protection, it has been considered that the protection of the 
author’s rights should stop at the doorstep of those who use the 
work.123 Nevertheless, because modern audio, visual, and above 
all, digital reproduction media enable these kinds of copies to be 
easily made, private copying has acquired over time an 
uncontrolled and massive nature which, as the judgment 
recognizes, causes serious economic damage to the authors. 
In response to this situation, European legislation recognizes 
that the right of the author (and also of some other holders of 
intellectual property, such as interpreters) to fair compensation is 
based on the estimated damage caused. From the viewpoint of both 
creditor and debtor, the author’s economic right to the work has 
certain special characteristics: 
1. From the creditor’s point of view, despite the right to which 
the author is entitled, he cannot claim it or receive it individually; 
rather, he may only act through one of the copyright management 
organizations (or “collecting societies”),124 such as that appearing 
in the above-mentioned judgment. After the fair compensation is 
paid, the organization distributes it among its members according 
to its own rules. This is because those revenues are not considered 
the fee paid or compensation for the individually authorized use of 
the work, but rather as global compensation for free use or 
unauthorized use (“fair use”) and, accordingly, for the loss of 
earnings due to the collective authors who are members of the 
organization. 
2. But, from the point of view of the person bound to perform 
an obligation (the debtor), there are greater particularities 
                                                                                                             
 
reproductions of works made for private use which are already available to the 
public from the need to obtain the authorization of the author; B.O.E. n. 97, Apr. 
22, 1996. 
 123. Josef Kohler explains this limitation in these terms (JOSEF KOHLER, 
URHEBERRECHT AN SCHRIFTWERKEN UND VERLAGSRECHT 181 (1981). 
 124. In Spanish, “entidades de gestión.” 
 
 
438 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
regarding these rights. As recognized in the judgment, given the 
practical difficulty to identify the plurality of anonymous private 
users (who make copies for personal or private use) of protected 
works, the laws have selected—within the long chain of 
intermediaries between the creator and the final user of the work—
certain persons who directly or indirectly facilitate access to the 
work. In this case, both the Dutch legislature and, until very 
recently,125 the Spanish legislature determined that manufacturers 
and importers of equipment, media and devices which enable 
digital, visual or audio reproduction of protected works are liable 
to pay fair compensation.  
Considering that Opus Supplies possessed such equipment and 
media (in addition to making them available to private persons126 
or providing them a reproduction service), the ECJ declared it 
liable to pay fair compensation for private copying to the Dutch 
authors associated with Stichting de Thuiskopie, despite the fact 
that Opus Supplies is not established in Netherlands. 
B. Delimitation of the Concept of “Communication to the Public” 
of the Work; ECJ Judgment of 21 October 2010: Padawan S.L. v. 
Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España 
This second judgment, also raised in a lawsuit brought by a 
copyright management organization (in this case, the Sociedad 
General de Autores y Editores de España, or SGAE) addressed the 
                                                                                                             
 125. Until now, art. 25 of the Spanish Intellectual Property Law imposed a 
copyright levy for private copying on the manufacturers of the reproduction 
equipment above-mentioned in the text. However, the 10th Additional 
Disposition, R.D.-L. 20/2011 of Dec. 30, on urgent budget, tax, and financial 
deficit correction measures, abolished this system and provides that the 
beneficiaries of fair compensation would be compensated from the Spanish 
national budget; B.O.E. n. 315, Dec. 31, 2011. 
 126. Without needing such copies to actually be made, since, as pointed out 
by another ECJ judgment (that of October 21, 2010, in case C-467/08, Padawan 
S.L. v. SGAE), “the fact that that equipment or devices are able to make copies 
is sufficient in itself to justify the application of the private copying levy, 
provided that the equipment or devices have been made available to natural 
persons as private users.” 
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question of fair compensation for private copying and was resolved 
in the same manner as in the precedent judgment.  
Another issue (widely discussed both before and after the 
Directive 2001/29/EC) that was addressed collaterally by this 
decision127 is related to whether the “on-demand”128 or “peer-to-
peer” (“p2p”) communication (i.e., one that only takes place upon 
individual request by each private user, and accordingly makes the 
work available at the place and time requested by the individual 
user) should be considered as public or private communication or 
use of the work. The typical intermediary in this form of access to 
works protected by intellectual property law is either a audiovisual 
media company (e.g., cable television channel), or a hospitality 
establishment, such as a hotel or restaurant, that, in connection 
with the main service or accommodation provided to its customers, 
facilitates as an additional service potential access to protected 
musical or audiovisual works for their enjoyment. 
However, a difficulty arose regarding this form of 
dissemination of the work with regard to the concept of “public 
communication” (which includes all the forms of intangible 
dissemination, e.g., those who make the work accessible to the 
public without prior distribution of copies of the same) during the 
preparation of Directive 2001/29/EC. The difficulty was in 
maintaining the public nature of the communication with respect to 
interactive or “on-demand” communication: first, because this 
                                                                                                             
 127. Indeed, such a debate took place prior to Directive 2001/29/EC and was 
resolved, for instance, in France. There, it resulted in a judgment contrary to the 
approach adopted later by the directive and the above-mentioned jurisprudence 
of the ECJ. In two lawsuits brought by S.A.C.E.M. (Société des auteurs, 
compositeurs et éditeurs de musique, a copyright management organization in 
France) against two hotel companies (Hôtel Lutetia and Hôtel Le printemps), the 
Cour de Cassation held that the defendant hotel companies had not committed 
an act of public communication subject to copyright, for having made available 
to the public works protected by intellectual property law in a private place, such 
as the hotel rooms. Cass., 1re Civ., Nov. 23, 1971, no. 70-12523. 
 128. Art. 1.2, Directive 98/48/EC of July 20, 1998, amending Directive 
98/34/EC, which establishes the rules relating to the information society 
services, defines the notion of interactive communication or “à la carte” in 
similar terms; 1998 O.J. (L217) 21. 
 
 
440 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 6 
 
form of dissemination involves an individualized access to the 
work, which makes it difficult for the law to include it within the 
acts of exploitation contained in the exclusive power of the 
author;129 and second, because such access may occur in places, 
such as a hotel room, that are supposedly private.  
Nevertheless, article 3 of Directive 2001/29/EC opted to 
include individualized or “on-demand” communication within the 
broader notion of “public communication”, thereby of allowing for 
the purpose of collective enjoyment, and not just private 
enjoyment, of the work. This makes the activity another one of the 
operating activities that should be authorized by the author, and 
one for which he should receive remuneration.  
Hence, the 2010 judgment mentioned above correctly applied 
the directive when, according to a 2006 judgment of the ECJ, it 
stated that “the right of communication to the public covers 
making the works available to the public in such a way that they 
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them.”130 
Several reasons justify this decision: 
First, we should take into account that a room in a hotel is not 
strictly private, since a number of people who are not related by 
personal ties may separately access it in a consecutive manner. 
Therefore, even though it is not a public place, it is a place 
accessible to the public.131 
                                                                                                             
 129. Indeed, only activities of collective use of the work, or making the work 
available to the public constitute acts of exploitation covered by intellectual 
property law. See JUANA MARCO MOLINA, LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN LA 
LEGISLACIÓN ESPAÑOLA 215 (Marcial Pons 1995). 
 130. The ECJ judgment of October 21, 2010 explicitly adopted the approach 
established in legal basis no. 58 of the ECJ judgment of July 13, 2006 in case C-
306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael 
Hoteles, S.A. The dispute originated from a claim for compensation for the 
exploitation of rights brought by SGAE, a copyright management organization, 
against a hotel company that offered to its customers additional cable television 
and music services, which allowed them the enjoyment of works protected by 
intellectual property law. 
 131. So it is also considered in the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, in 
their legal basis nos. 48, 49, 53 and 54. 
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Second, it is not inherent to the activity of public 
communication that the disseminated work is received or enjoyed 
simultaneously by a plurality of persons to whom access is 
facilitated. Such simultaneity is exclusive to the traditional forms 
of communication such as stage productions. However, with 
technological advances allowing the work to be recorded or 
captured and be disseminated at a different time or place, the 
simultaneity of reception is no longer a necessary characteristic of 
the activities of communication. Consequently, the legal definition 
of this form of exploitation does not require simultaneous 
reception.132 As recognized by the above-mentioned jurisprudence, 
what is crucial is the potentiality, not the effectiveness, of the 
communication or making of the work available to the public.133 
Those who perform such collecting activities through 
intermediate devices (i.e., cable, speakers or similar devices, as 
well as individual receivers that are made available to third parties) 
are not mere receivers of the work, but are instead making an 
autonomous act of communication to the public, which requires 
new authorization from the author, since, through their 
intervention, they expanded the originally-intended scope of the 
communication previously authorized.134 
                                                                                                             
 132. It is referred to in Spanish Intellectual Property Law (R.D.-L. 1/1996, 
supra note 122), in which Art. 20.1 provides:  
Communication to the public means any act whereby a number of 
persons can have access to the work without prior distribution of copies 
to each of those persons. 
Communication shall not be considered public when it takes place in a 
strictly domestic environment that is not integrated or connected to a 
distribution network of any kind. 
 133. So declares the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, in which legal 
basis no. 43 states: “[I]t is not decisive . . . that customers who have not 
switched on the television have not actually had access to the works.” 
 134. Indeed, the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, considers it so (see 
its legal basis numbers 41 and 42):  
. . . [I]f reception is for a larger audience . . . a new section of the 
receiving public hears or sees the work and the communication of the 
program . . . no longer constitutes simple reception of the program itself 
but is an independent act through which the broadcast work is 
communicated to a new public. . . . [S]uch public reception falls within 
the scope of the author's exclusive authorization right;” and, “The 
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Finally, it should be taken into account that this new act of 
communication of protected works provides its agents with a profit 
or benefit at the expense of the author. Indeed, despite the fact that 
such activities frequently do not involve direct income, since, as in 
the case of hospitality establishments, they do not receive from the 
public an initial compensation (such as an entry fee), the public 
communication of the work constitutes an indirect source of 
income. This is because such activities either allow the 
communicator to apply a surcharge to the price of the main service 
performed (e.g., a surcharge for the hotel room equipped with 
devices permitting such individualized or “on-demand” 
communication) or, at least, because it provides the communicator 
with a patrimonial benefit derived from the potential increase in 
the number of his customers due to the fact that this form of 
communication is facilitated.135 
Thus, given that the very existence of intellectual property 
rights is justified by the objective of giving a share to the author 
from all of the earnings that his work or creation is able to produce, 
it seems necessary that this type of use might also be remunerated, 
in the same way that the acts of direct and simultaneous 
communication to the public are remunerated. This is, ultimately, 
                                                                                                             
 
clientele of a hotel forms such a new public [since the] transmission of 
the broadcast work to that clientele using television sets is not just a 
technical means to ensure or improve reception of the original 
broadcast. . . . On the contrary, the hotel is the organization which 
intervenes . . . to give access to the protected work to its customers. 
 135. As recognized in the ECJ judgment of 2006, supra note 130, in its legal 
basis no. 44:  
. . . [T]he action by the hotel by which it gives access to the broadcast 
work to its customers must be considered an additional service 
performed with the aim of obtaining some benefit. It cannot be disputed 
that the provision of that service has an influence on the hotel’s 
standing and, therefore, on the price of rooms. Therefore, even taking 
the view, as does the Commission of the European Communities, that 
the pursuit of profit is not a necessary condition for the existence of a 
communication to the public, it is in any event established that the 
communication is of a profit-making nature . . . . 
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what the judgments of the ECJ herein commented intend to 
recognize to the creators. 
 
 
